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I. Form Knowledge and the Pragmatist Challenge
 
In his critical commentary to John McDowell’s Book Mind and World, Robert Brandom declares McDowell’s attempt to derive the knowledge of universals (including the knowledge of forms) from an already conceptualized perception 
as failed.1 As reason for this failure, Brandom identifies McDowell’s understanding of 
knowledge as an individual think-act of an individual mind, a circumstance that leads 
to the problem of the intersubjective adjustment of the contents of each individual 
thinker’s thoughts. Nevertheless, both McDowell and Brandom agree that forms – 
as well as all other universals – are purely noematic objects, i.e. objects created by 
the activity of thinking, which have no real existence whatsoever. The only entities 
1 Robert Brandom, “Perception and Rational Constraint – McDowell’s Mind and World”, Phil-
osophical Issues 7 (1995): 241-259.
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having a real existence are singular material things. McDowell and Brandom share 
this nominalist stance with the traditional Empiricists. Brandom also agrees with Mc-
Dowell as to the diagnosis according to which the solely noematically constituted 
form-concepts lack any normative power, i.e. neither their content nor the method 
of their constitution can claim any universal validity either as criteria of goodness or 
as categorical imperatives. 
There are two traditional proposals for resolving this problem: either by means 
of the voluntarist claim according to which the extension of the normative power of 
a noematically constituted universal beyond the confines of an individual mind has to 
be enforced by stipulation, or through the relativist claim that universal validity has 
to be given up completely, while accepting a mere local and hypothetical validity of 
such “general” concepts instead. Both proposals lead, however, to the same impasse, 
namely to the apparent insight that normativity is nothing else than a kind of more 
or less gentle coercion.
Brandom regards McDowell’s theory of conceptualized perception as an attempt 
to avoid this impasse, in which every traditional empiricist account is caught, without 
betraying the Nominalist Credo that prevails since Ockham’s times. Brandom realiz-
es, however, that McDowell’s theory is not only incapable of resolving the problem 
of the normativity of form-concepts, but also that it rather removes it from the vi-
cinity of any intellectual solution, because it declares the knowledge of universals as 
a non-analyzable fundamental fact of the world. Nevertheless, Brandom thinks that 
McDowell’s conclusions can be avoided without the need to give up fundamental em-
piricist and nominalist principles, providing the knowledge of universals is conceived 
as a sort of collective noematic achievement that is rendered possible by the collec-
tive acquaintance with material things within the scope of a social practice. Brandom 
thus joins Pragmatism, that great philosophical tradition, which has endeavored to 
repair the flaws of classical Empiricism since the end of the 19th century, along with 
its 20th century heir and successor, Logical Empiricism, without falling back to the 
long ago vanquished ideas of Aristotelian form-realism or, still worse, of Platonism.
Contemporary Pragmatism is split in two “Grand Families”. Their common de-
nominator is the thesis of the primacy of knowledge obtained through participation 
in practice before propositional knowledge of both the quiddity (the what-it-is of an 
object) and the haecceity (the so-it-is-here-and-now of an object) of the objects. 
Pragmatism perceives as practice every joint action that is sufficiently stable and suc-
cessful over a prolonged period of time and across a certain spatial area so that its 
performance can encompass several generations. A practice is therefore part of the 
reality that every human has been confronted with and has had to cope with since the 
moment of his or her birth. This definition entails, on the other hand, the claim that 
every potential participant in a practice has to possess the faculty of adapting her 
individual actions to the actions of the other practice participants, without recurring 
to any higher noematic objects like form-concepts or abstract knowledge. The prima-
ry acquaintance with a given practice takes place by blindly imitating and following 
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the actions of the “fully grown” and already competent participants. It should be 
stressed at this point that linguistic communication is also regarded as part of this 
inescapable life-worldly common denominators. A further common belief of both 
“Grand Families” of Pragmatism is that the structuring moments of practices – their 
rules and forms – are constituted by the subsequent reflective activity of the mind 
and the analysis of the primarily unquestioningly accepted practices. 
The differences between both “Grand Families” become manifest at the level of 
the methods that lead from the life-worldly basis of practices to the noematic “su-
perstructure” of the general and normative concepts as well as of the exact theories 
of the sciences that are constituted by them and that are thought to sustain theoret-
ically the corresponding life-wordly practices. One “Family” claims – with reference 
to the “founding elders” of Pragmatism, W. James and J. Dewey – that the particular 
reasons for the choice of a particular scientific method are to be found in the limbo of 
the traditions of a life-worldly reflective practice2, and asserts – inspired by the late 
Wittgenstein and by Quine – that it is the practice of linguistic communication that 
enables both the basic co-operation in the life-worldly social and poietic practices as 
well as the elaborated, knowledge-oriented and strictly rule-guided communication 
of scientific practices. According to this doctrine – that we would here call “Ordinary 
Language Pragmatism”, – a person is introduced simultaneously to both language 
games, and the reflective activity of the mind consists basically in clearly distinguish-
ing between these language games and in setting up systematic correlations between 
them. This is so – according to the main argument of Ordinary Language Pragmatism 
– because scientific language has been always part of human everyday language, 
notwithstanding the fact that the scientific contents, i.e. what counts as a scientific 
fact, can change with the passage of time.
The other “Grand Family”, better known as “Methodical Philosophy”3, criticizes 
its linguistically oriented relatives for being caught in Relativism, reinforced by a 
holistic attitude towards meaning. Methodical Philosophy tries to avoid this problem 
by establishing a historico-hierarchical relationship between both the practice and the 
language levels: According to it, the scientific practices and their specific languages 
have evolved from the life-worldly practices in a historical process of overcoming 
concrete problems that impeded the normal flow of everyday life. The various sci-
ences have come and can still come into existence out of this kind of necessity – as 
“Sciences of Need” and not as “Sciences of Luxury”4 – by the “idealization” and 
2 To this “Family” belong in the late 20th century among others: F. Kambartel, P. Stekel-
er-Weithofer, H.-J. Schneider, H. Putnam, R. Rorty und R. Brandom.
3 To this purely German speaking “Family”, which includes the so called “Methodical Construc-
tivism” and its heir “Methodical Culturalism”, belong among others: P. Lorenzen, W. Kamlah, 
K. Lorenz, P. Janich, J. Mittelstraß, C.F. Gethmann, D. Hartmann, M. Weingarten und M. Gut-
mann.
4 Paul Lorenzen, “Konstruktivismus”, Journal for General Philosophy of Science 25, no. 1 
(1994): 125-133.
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the “refinement” of the methods, the ends and the objects of the life-worldly prac-
tices to the corresponding scientific ones. This is achieved mainly by the so-called 
“material abstraction”, which is used for the primary “operational” constitution of 
the scientific objects. The term “operational” means that in order to establish the 
equivalence relation underlying the constitution of each scientific object, a univer-
sally applicable technical process (under terrestrial conditions) is used that enables 
the prototype-free5 determination of the equivalence relation and subsequently the 
prototype-free definition of the given scientific object. The reproducibility of the 
operational definition procedures is safeguarded by the so-called “Principle of Me-
thodical Order”, which demands that the order of the linguistic description follows 
strictly the order of the actions that are necessary and sufficient for the operational 
definition. Its validity relies on the assumption that a univocally defined aim can be 
achieved in principle by a univocally determined action or a chain of actions and 
that in case more than one chains of actions lead to a given aim, one of them is the 
“shortest” (“Principle of Pragmatic Order”).
The above outlined procedure makes clear that the methodical variant of Prag-
matism can in fact avoid, on the one hand, the obstacles of Holism and Relativism, 
by constructing the abstract language of the scientific objects and methods on the 
fundament of an object language that does not contain any general concepts (in the 
terminology of this variant of Pragmatism: abstractors and abstract terms), but only 
individual and sortal terms, indexicals as well as quantifiers and junctors. On the oth-
er hand, however, this procedure has to face the problem of not being able to justify 
the choice of the logical method that is used for the constitution, thus becoming 
prone to Voluntarism. In order to resolve also this issue, some Methodical Pragma-
tists tried to derive the language of logic from an underlying life-worldly language 
of argumentation. Such efforts are, however, in vain since they cannot explain why 
the idealization of a life-worldly language of argumentation leads straightforwardly 
to classical predicate logic. Even the introduction of a “Relevance Logic”6 does not 
provide any relief because it replaces the classical concept of truth by a quite opaque 
idea of “relevance”, that either leads to the same old logical paradoxes, or obscures 
completely the logical coherence of scientific statements.
Despite their differences regarding the implementation of practice and agency in 
5 The term “prototype free” means that the constitution of the equivalence relation does 
not depend on any real thing that acts as a measure or as standard for the object defined by 
equivalence relation in question. An object constitution that would depend on a prototype 
would be confronted with the intractable problem to prove the existence of the equivalence 
between the prototype and the examples of the object that were created according to it. The 
prototype bound definition of an object is thus in a similar way flawed as the concept of ideas 
that states that ideas exist separately from the things that realize them. This concept is refuted 
in the Platonic dialogue Parmenides.
6 Dirk Hartmann, On Inferring. An Enquiry into Relevance and Validity (Paderborn: Mentis, 
2003).
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the determination of the universality and normativity of general concepts, because 
both “Grand Families” of Pragmatism begin with the reflexive analysis of local action 
contexts, they face also a common problem, namely the fact that their common 
concept of practice relies on the local and culturally bound value of a given context 
of actions and not on its universal goodness. However, the very fact of a locally 
established action context that is of a certain value for its participants cannot justify 
its universal goodness. This justification cannot be achieved even if one succeeds 
in enlarging the group of participants by voluntary joining, in such a manner that it 
may factually encompass the totality of the existing human population, since even a 
worldwide participation in a context of actions is not immune against the possibility 
of an action that is essentially lacking universal goodness despite the fact that it 
has a worldwide value: Many critics of the “current circumstances”, from the an-
cient opponents of slavery to anti-monarchist and anti-mercantilists of the European 
Enlightenment to the contemporary ecological, humanist and anti-capitalist move-
ments, stress in their argumentations that humanity has arranged itself with a merely 
apparent comfort that misses the real end of a universally good life.
Both “families” of Pragmatism are aware of the problem of the normative univer-
salization of merely noematically constituted general concepts. They have made at-
tempts to overcome it by introducing a variety of principles – of which the Principles 
of the Methodical and the Pragmatic Order are two examples – that are supposed to 
ensure that voluntarist and/or relativist impasses are avoided. The introduction of 
principles, however, just shifts the problem without resolving it: principles are namely 
notoriously taunted with the flaw that their problem-solving ability can neither be 
justified nor evaluated in advance. In their best, case principles can prove their value 
only through the success of their application. Again, one has to decide if this success 
is a proof of the universal goodness or merely of the local value of the principle. With 
respect to this, principles are even of a poorer status than axioms because the latter 
raise the (admittedly not easily redeemable) claim that they are true and their truth 
is knowable.
Methodical Culturalism tries to circumnavigate this problem by declaring trans-
culturality as a necessary criterion for the universal goodness of scientific objects. 
Transculturality is, however, not sufficient since the factual overcoming of cultural 
borders is no indication for the transformation of something locally valuable into 
something universally good, even if one demands that the acceptance of new norms 
and procedures has to be strictly voluntary. There is namely no argument that obliges 
any life-worldly practice to accept the advice of scientific knowledge, except for 
Lorenzen’s hint, that existential privation will see to it so that it happens. This may be 
a striking argument; it has, however, the disadvantage that its addressee will turn the 
tables at the first opportunity. The skeptical attitude towards science that has been 
manifest since Husserl’s Krisisschrift7 is the best indication for the failure of a merely 
7 Edmund Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaft und die transzendentale Phänome-
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concrete problems- resolving science to conquer also the hearts of people as the 
method for achieving universal goodness.
In my opinion, there are two reasons for the inability of Pragmatism to overcome 
these aporias:
Firstly, pragmatism as well as the totality of the 20th century Philosophy of Sci-
ence unconditionally accepts the dogma of the immediate reference of language to 
the world as it has explicitly been proposed in Wittgenstein’s work. The main differ-
ence between Pragmatism and the Philosophy of Language that has evolved under 
the influence of Logical Empiricism is that Philosophers of Language regard the world 
as the sum of “elementary existences”8 that exist independently of the subjects of 
knowledge, while pragmatists regard it as a network of practice contexts that define 
what an “elementary existence” is.
Secondly, pragmatism cannot provide a criterion that is independent from the 
concept of action for the distinction between such action contexts that constitute a 
practice and such ones that do not. The “criterion of the success of action” cannot 
fulfill this purpose because it depends on the internal coherence between an action 
and its aim. The desired criterion of demarcation, however, has to qualify something 
as a practice (or as a non-practice) independently of the factual success of actions.
In the following considerations, I will aim at showing that this criterion can be 
obtained only by a form-theoretically founded theory of Goodness, which treats 
forms as real and not as merely noematically constituted universals. A further conse-
quence of such a realist form-theoretical foundation of Goodness is the abandoning 
of the dogma of the immediate reference of language to the world.
II. The Foundation of Practice in Goodness
 
The problem of determining the very nature of practice and its differentiation 
from a mere opportunistic coincidence of actions can be found in philosophical think-
ing since its beginnings in Greek antiquity. It is implicitly present in the dispute be-
tween Parmenides and Heraclitus about the nature of being and the truth, and also 
in the controversy between Cratylus and Hermogenes in the homonymous Platonic 
dialogue. There, Cratylus takes up the Parmenidean position that declares truth as the 
uppermost good and identifies it with the being itself, also claiming that in order for 
a true sentence to mean the being, a its parts too – every single word it is composed 
of – have to be directly related to being, down to the phonetic structure. His friend 
Hermogenes, on the other hand, is an adherent of Heraclitus’ opinion and asserts (in 
contrast to Cratylus) that both the semantic relationship between word and object 
nologie (Hamburg: Meiner, 1977).
8 The exact nature of these elementary existences is defined differently in each particular the-
ory: Carnap, for example, determines them as “elementary experiences”, Wittgenstein (in the 
Tractatus) as “states of affairs”, Quine as “stimuli”, and Russell as “facts”.
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as well as its phonetic structure are purely human constructions. Meaning and struc-
ture of a word are – in modern terms – conventional. Socrates, appointed by both 
parties as an arbiter, initially supports Cratylus’ position, but finally comes to the 
conclusion that the correspondence relationship between word and object cannot be 
iso-structural, since even in the Greek language there are too many deviations and 
variants in the phonetic structure of a given word, and it cannot be that each single 
variant depicts the nature of the referred object, or even an aspect of it. With this 
conclusion, however, Socrates manoeuvres himself in an aporetic impasse because 
already at the beginning of the dialogue, he rebutted Hermogenes’/Heraclitus’ claim 
that both, word meaning and phonetics, were purely conventional with the argument 
that if this were the case then a science of word semantics and of linguistics would be 
impossible; however, both sciences do exist.
As in many other cases of such “Platonic aporias”, the resolution of which is only 
foreshadowed in the Platonic oeuvre, the merit of giving an explicit solution of the 
Cratylus problem goes to Aristotle: The aporetic situation between word and object 
comes up because both Cratylos and Hermogenes think that there is a direct iconic 
relationship between word and real object, the nature of which they seek to describe. 
This relationship, as Aristotle adheres, is, however, an indirect one. Word and real 
object are separated by the νοῦς, the faculty of the human soul that aims at the 
knowledge of the essence of real objects. Words depict solely the contents of noetic 
states, of thoughts. Their only connection to real objects is that they enable the pho-
netic representation of the noetic contents, which are the instances that depict the 
essence of real objects. Thus, the threat of an insurmountable relativism is banned: 
The relationship between thought and corresponding real object is universal, while 
the relationship between thought and word is, on the other hand, conventional and 
relative. This relativity is, however, neutralized because all linguistic systems refer to 
the same universal correspondence relationship between thoughts and real objects.
The Aristotelian solution relies on the fundamental belief that the human soul 
is not only able to synthesize a more or less accurate picture of reality from the 
data provided by the senses (Aristotle calls this faculty of the soul φαντασία – 
imagination), but that it is furthermore able by means of the faculty of the νοῦς 
– this term will be translated here with “intellect” – to distinguish in this picture the 
essential from the non-essential (i.e. accidental) aspects of the depicted real objects. 
The intellect is able to extract from the picture synthesized by imagination those 
“elements” that are responsible for the quiddity of a given real object and to com-
bine them with the particular picture of this object in the judgment “This here is an 
X” – this faculty of the intellect being called “cognizing”. In contrast to humans, 
creatures endowed only with the gift of imagination can only relate themselves to 
their particular imagination-generated pictures of the real world in the particular way 
that is given to them by virtue of their kind, without being able to distinguish between 
the essential and the accidental aspects of these pictures (unless the nature of their 
kinds has already anticipated such distinctions, something which manifests itself as 
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instinctive behavior).9
The main difference between human language and the voices of creatures 
equipped only with imagination is that the latter use their voices in order to repre-
sent phonetically their kind-specific imagination generated pictures of reality, while 
human language has the capacity to represent the content of the mental states that 
refer or correspond to the essence of the perceived real objects, i.e. the judgmental 
thoughts: The words obtain their object references by means of their connection to 
the thoughts. This model leaves enough leeway also for word meanings that refer to 
thoughts generated by the νοῦς for its own “internal” purposes, e.g. for the classi-
fication of being, or the construction of quantitative ratios, or in order to combine 
judgments.
Veraciousness and sociality (both essential traits of human beings) are the direct 
result of the cognitive and linguistic capabilities of the intellect. This is so because 
on the one hand the knowledge of the essential aspects of the objects is associated 
with the need for truth, that is with the need to know an object as it really and es-
sentially is: Those who understand what true knowledge (σοφία) is, also understand 
that they also seek and desire true knowledge – so Aristotle’s claim (in unison with 
Parmenides, Plato and Socrates). And those who know what σοφία is, are ‘σοφίαs 
φίλοι’ – philosophers. The faculty of speech, on the other hand, liberates knowledge 
from the fetters of the individual confinement of each single mind and enables its 
mutual communication. Thus individual knowledge can be acquired by other cog-
nizers and its truth can be reassessed and if necessary corrected – philosophizing is a 
genuinely social activity. It is, however, not necessary that in order to philosophize 
there has to be an actual assembly or a synchronous repetition of a given activity. 
In order to philosophize jointly, it is sufficient that the fellow philosophers just rec-
ognize and respect what one does. It is not necessary to respond immediately. They 
can live in another place or at another time and their access to the knowledge of a 
fellow philosopher can be mediated solely by scripture or by hearsay. They can com-
municate their own results much later, perhaps after an extended time of reflection. 
As long, however, as each single philosopher pursues the universal common good of 
true knowledge and aligns his own activity with it, he will participate in this world- 
and humanity-embracing project, that gives the paradigm for the genuinely human 
activity that since Plato is called a practice (πρᾶξις).
According to this understanding, a practice is not a collective activity aiming 
merely at an end that cannot be achieved by a single person, but a common effort 
for the sake of an end that is good for human nature itself (and thus for every past, 
present and future human being at every place of the universe). The universality of 
the goodness of an end does not entail, however, that this end is also absolutely 
9 This model can also explain phenomena as the learning and dressing capability of higher an-
imals, as well as the capacity of some higher mammals to “sense the voice of reason”, i.e. to 
react appropriately to human speech. 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 20/02/2020 23:32:18 |
[ 53 ]
CONATUS • JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY VOLUME 3, ISSUE 1 • 2018
valuable. The value of an end is assessed according to its local utility in relation to 
the respective local circumstances that determine the actualization of human life at 
a particular place at a given time. Its goodness on the other hand is based on the fact 
that it is in a certain relationship to the human nature itself and the degree of this 
goodness is assessed according to its proximity to this nature.10
III. The Practice of Knowing the Truth and its Objects
The participation in a practice is motivated solely by the knowledge of the good-
ness of its ends with philosophical knowledge being the end in the highest degree 
of goodness.11 All other particular and object specific practices contain this aiming 
at true knowledge, although the knowledge aimed at it is not universal, but con-
fined to the nature of a particular object. All particular practices have nevertheless 
in common that their specific ends are good, so that they have to be respected by 
every man, despite the fact that their specific values might be different for different 
cultures or needs. 
Philosophy as the practice of knowing the truth is aimed at every bit of real 
existence as well as in every noematic object that results from the activity of intel-
lect – concepts, oncepttions, judgments, and syllogisms. Unlike any other particular 
science, philosophy has thus no specific – real or noematic – object. Philosophy can-
not be identified with any particular science or any particular practice. Nevertheless, 
philosophy has its own specific methods of inquiry, which consist in determining the 
existence of an object, either by proving its reality or by proving its conceptual truth, 
both activities being traditionally labelled respectively as Ontology and Logic. Con-
ceptual truth relies, however, on ontological truth because real existence manifests 
itself as occurrence in a spontaneous and irreducible manner. Without contact to real 
objects, the intellect wouldn’t be able to synthesize an imagination-picture of the 
world, nor would it be able to recognize in it those aspects that are responsible for 
the quiddities of the real objects. It should be remarked at this point, however, that 
knowledge of real objects is not only sense mediated, but can be achieved also by an 
immediate mode, which will be discussed in a later section of this essay.
Thus, the objects of the practice of knowing the truth are the real and noemat-
ic, i.e. mere conceptual, truths with the latter being dependent on the former. Real 
truths are determined by their correspondence to real objects and mere conceptual 
truths are determined by their oncepttual reference to real and to other conceptual 
truths.
10 Instead of “goodness” and “value” one could use the terms “intrinsic” and “extrinsic value” 
or “eigenvalue” and “relative value”. 
11 See for example Aristotle, De Anima.
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IV. Ontological Excurse: Real Objects
The ontological primacy of reality over conceptuality requires that, in order to 
understand the nature of the practice of knowledge of the truth, the kinds and the 
nature of real objects first have to be determined. Ontology thus belongs to the 
objects of this practice. Real objects befall the human soul as irreducible primary 
experiences. This means that it is not in the absolute discretion of the soul to deter-
mine the constitution of their imaginative and of their noematic representations. Real 
objects present themselves to the intellect as primary phenomena. The influence of 
the capabilities of the intellect is confined to achieving a higher or lower “richness” 
of their noetic representations according to the extent of the contribution of each 
particular sense to their constitution and according to the ability of the intellect to 
distinguish clearly in the imagination-synthesized picture the aspects that are consti-
tutive for their quiddities. 
The classical ontological tradition distinguishes primarily following classes of 
real objects12:
•	 Formed single things.
•	 Forms of formed single things.
•	 Formless thing-resembling13 singular phenomena (“formless single things”).
•	 Real properties of formed and formless single things.
•	 Real relations between formed and formless single things and between 
properties of single things.
There are some good reasons to amend this catalogue by the class of formed 
processes, the class of the so-called tropes, the class of the formed and formless14 
phases, and the class of the spatiotemporal constellations. For the purposes of this 
essay we will, however, refrain from doing so and confine our reflections to the tra-
ditional ontological classes. We will also not touch the issue of the so-called “prime 
matter”.
The fundamental ontological class is that of formed single things. Formed single 
12 The classes described here do not match exactly the Aristotelian categories. The class of 
the formed single things, for example, corresponds to the Aristotelian category of substance, 
but the classes of real properties and real relations encompass several particular Aristotelian 
categories. 
13 The term “thing-resembling” means that the objects in question are spatiotemporally dis-
tinct. Examples for such entities are stones, drops, and clouds.
14 We do not use here the term “amorphous” because it is used in Chemistry in order to des-
ignate the absence of a certain material property (crystal structure). With “formless phases” 
we mean those chemical substances that did not observe the “law of constant proportions”. 
It holds in general that every formless phase is also amorphous, but not that every amorphous 
phase is formless. 
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things are characterized by their existential discreetness and self-sufficiency, i.e. they 
are spatiotemporally separate existences and they do not rely on any other factor in 
order to exist discreetly. Formed single things are formed, because their constitution 
shows that they owe their existence to an also real general concept of plan that 
renders possible judgments regarding the degree of compliance of a given formed 
single thing to the specifications of its corresponding plan, as well as the degree 
of deviation from those specifications. This underlying real general plan, the form, 
determines thus the quiddity of a formed single thing. Formed single things are also 
characterized by their existential integrity: their parts do not belong to same object 
class. Parts of plants and animals are not plants and animals, parts of machines, are 
not machines (at least not machines of the same functionality: parts of clocks are not 
clocks etc.). The parts of formed single things can be also formed, as it is the case for 
example with the organs of animals or with the gears making up a mechanic clock, or 
they can be formless.
On the other hand, the quiddity of formless thing-resembling phenomena is de-
termined solely by their external look – by their shape. This shape can be definite, 
resembling e.g. a geometric figure, as is the case with mountains, piles of sand or 
floating droplets of a liquid, or nondescript, as is the case with stones or volumes 
of liquids that are flowing on a plane surface. The absence of a form has the conse-
quence that formless things lack a criterion for being “well realized” as well as an 
existential integrity. Their parts thus fall into the same class as the still intact form-
less things: parts of piles are piles, parts of stones are stones, parts of mountains are 
mountains, and parts of drops are drops and so on.15
Formed single things can be classified into natural and artificial ones. The form 
of a natural formed single thing is real cause and integral part of its quiddity (another 
formulation of this circumstance is that a natural formed thing carries its form in it-
self). Artificial formed things, on the other hand, receive their form from an external 
source – in the case of terrestrial artificial things, this source is the planning of human 
activity. The form of artificially formed things is, in contrast to natural things, not 
a real object, but rather the content of a thought – the forms of artificial things are 
noematic, i.e. solely conceptual objects. On the contrary, natural formed things are 
able to realize their corresponding forms by means of a process that is inherent to 
them (this process is called life) and are also called substances in the narrow sense.
Regarding the existence of artificial formless things, it appears that already the 
term “formless artificial thing” is inconsistent und cannot therefore refer to any truth, 
be it a real or a conceptual one. This is so because an artificial thing is by its very 
nature the result of a planning activity that realizes a concept, i.e. a noematic form. 
An earth pile that has been erected in order to serve as a tumulus has thus not only 
a shape, but also fulfills a purpose, which is part of its concept. There are formless 
15 There are also some conventional deviations from this classification, e.g. in some languages 
there are distinctions according to the size between mountains and hills, stones and rocks etc.
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phenomena that can result from planning human activity, for example garbage dumps 
and heaps of rubble and debris, but they are not nevertheless the products of such an 
activity in the narrow sense of the term “product”. 
Real objects, formed as well as formless ones, and natural as well as artificial 
ones, are determined with regard to their actual existence by their real properties and 
their real relations to other real existences. The real properties of a thing determine 
its haecceity. Insofar, these properties depend on its form, therefore are its essential 
properties. Any other property that does not fulfill this criterion is accidental. The 
properties of formless things are thus in their entirety accidental.
When it comes to real relations, the most important ones are identity and cau-
sality. Identity is the univocal relation between the haecceity and the quiddity of a 
formed real thing. In order for identity to exist, both haecceity and quiddity have to 
have real existence. This means that real identity is proper only to natural formed 
things. Artificial things and formless things only have a conceptual identity, the for-
mer because their forms are conceptual objects and the latter because their quiddity 
is defined solely conventionally, therefore solely conceptually. 
Causality is the relation of the absolute (i.e. necessary and sufficient) conditional 
dependence of a real object on another real object. The real object, the existence 
of which is the absolute condition for the existence of another real object is called 
its cause. The real object, the existence of which depends on the cause is the effect 
of that cause. The causal connection between real things is an effective one, while 
forms of real formed things and the formed things themselves are connected by a 
form-causal relationship. Forms of artificial real things are not real themselves and 
cannot thus be connected directly causally with them. They exert their causal faculty, 
however, mediated by human activity, being its ends. The causal relationship between 
forms of artificial things and their realizations is in effect a relationship of finality or 
final causality.
V. The Immediate Knowledge of the Human Form as the Foundation of the Knowl-
edge of Forms in General
The practice of knowing the truth relies on the capability of the intellect to 
distinguish in the imagination-picture of reality between formed and formless things, 
to “extract” the forms of the former from the manifold of their perceived properties 
and to establish the relation of formal causality between the “extracted” forms and 
the perceived things. However, how does intellect know in the first place that there 
are forms that can be sought for? How does it know that forms exist and that they 
are real causes of the formed things? McDowell’s assumption that perception itself 
is “conceptualized”16 does not provide any clarification, since in this case, one also 
has to assume that forms have not only the capacity of formal, but also of effective 
16 John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge & London: OUP, 1994).
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causality17 – otherwise they could not reach intellect via the perception organs. Fur-
thermore, even if one accepts that forms are effective-causal entities, the effective 
capability cannot explain how their forming capability can be filtered out from the 
stream of perception. A further argument against the effecttive-causal capability of 
forms can be derived from Plato’s so-called “third man argument”, which is put for-
ward in the platonic dialogue Parmenides in order to disprove the claim that ideas 
are separate real entities like the things that are their manifestations: if forms were 
effective-causal, like the Socratic ideas, then they should manifest themselves as spa-
tio-temporal entities. If this were the case, then they should also have a real identity, 
i.e. their haecceity should be in a univocal relation to their quiddity. But if forms had 
quiddity and haecceity, then they would have their own formal causes, which would 
in turn also be effective-causal entities, since otherwise, they could not exert their 
forming capacities. This assumption leads to an infinite regress of formal causes, 
rendering the very idea of formal causality an absurdity.
Furthermore, if perceptions were conceptualized, then there would be no error 
possible with respect to determining the essential properties of a perceived thing – it 
could only be possible that we are not able to perceive them because of a failure of 
our perceptive capabilities. In other words, if perceptions were conceptualized, then 
we should have a sort of “concept perceptions” in the same sense that we have col-
or, sound, tactile or other kinds of categorized perceptions. The only possible error 
would be that of correspondence, i.e. it could be possible that we could have the 
perception of an essential property of the perceived thing, for example the perception 
of quiddity of a thing that does not correspond to the real quiddity of this particular 
thing. Nevertheless, we could not err regarding the fact that we had a perception 
of a certain “quiddical” quality (e.g. a perception of “felineness” or “bovineness”) 
in the same manner as we may have a certain color perception that does not match 
the actual color of the perceived thing. The only thing that we can say about formed 
things perceived for the first time, however, is at most that they are just formed and 
not what their form is. Knowing the form of a perceived thing, i.e. learning to distin-
guish its essential from its accidental properties, is something that we achieve after 
a detailed examination of the thing in question and even then this knowledge is still 
fallible and subject to revision.
Traditional Empiricism takes this fundamental fallibility of form knowledge as 
the reason to deny completely the real existence of forms. To the empiricist under-
standing forms are purely noematic truths that are “fabricated” by means of the noet-
ic processing of a real, continuous input of “experiences”. Whether real things are the 
effective cause of this input or whether it is the irreducible and absolute fundament 
17 Hartmann, On Inferring. An Enquiry into Relevance and Validity, 42: “The world itself must 
exert a rational constraint on our thinking. If we suppose that rational answerability lapses at 
some outermost point of the space of reasons, short of the world itself, our picture ceases to 
depict anything recognizable as empirical judgment”.
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of our knowledge18 is a controversial issue among empiricists that at this point is of 
no concern to us. The problem of empiricism is that if the knowledge of forms is a 
pure product of our individual intellect then it is a mystery that we have a common 
knowledge of forms even if this knowledge is confined to the knowledge of the hu-
man form. There are indeed empiricist positions that deny the existence of a common 
knowledge of forms, including the knowledge of the human form, and declare the 
fact of the intersubjective coincidence of such a knowledge as a contingent historical 
phenomenon. According to this stance, the normative force that emanates from form 
knowledge is nothing else than the enforcement of a particular belief, even if this 
belief proves in retrospect to be beneficial to everyone having adopted it. However, 
in this case, it is not possible to prove that the benefit resulting from the enforced 
acceptance of a particular merely noematically constituted form knowledge is real 
and not merely an apparent one. A purely empiricist theory of knowledge that totally 
denies the real existence of forms has great difficulties to justify even the intersub-
jective validity of a merely noematic form knowledge – an empiricist justification of 
the universality of such a knowledge cannot be given at all.
There has to be thus at least one kind of form knowledge that is based on the 
real existence of at least one form, since without such a knowledge we cannot even 
realize that humans belong to the same natural kind. The empiricist claim is correct, 
however, that it seems to be the case that this knowledge is not accessible via per-
ceptive experience. It is only the empiricist solution of this problem, namely that 
this knowledge is the result of the constructive activity of intellect that leads to the 
impasse. The correct answer is rather that the knowledge of the human form is the 
background, on the basis of which the intellect of an individual human being can in-
terpret the data provided by perception so that it can recognize in its own individual 
imagination-picture of reality other human beings. Therefore, the human form has to 
be known in a way that is completely independent from the content of any perception 
or from any other kind of mediated experience. The knowledge of the human form 
as well as of its real existence has to be a direct and immediate result of the activity 
of intellect, a result of that what is called pure thinking. Only so is it possible for us 
a) to know that we are formed single things and b) to distinguish between those per-
ceptions referring to the fact of the reality of our existence as a formed single thing 
(proprioception) and those ones that are sensory perceptions of the external world, 
including the perception of the “exterior” of our bodies.
The knowledge of the human form arises together with the emergence of con-
scious thinking. The exact point of its emergence during the ontological develop-
ment of a human being is of no relevance for our considerations. The important issue 
is that every human being has an immediate and direct knowledge of the human form 
from the very first moment when conscious thinking commences. The first thoughts 
of a human being regard the human form and the fact that it is its actualization, i.e. 
18 The first claim was made e.g. by Locke and Quine, the latter e.g. by Hume and Carnap.
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that it has a quiddity and a haecceity and that both modes of being are connected by 
the relation of identity. Quoting a traditional characterization, this knowledge is at 
the beginning of human life obscure and confused. Every human being has, however, 
the ability to gain by means of thinking and by active interaction with other humans 
a clearer and more distinct idea of its form. And, despite the fact that the knowledge 
of the human form is at the beginning of life obscure and confused, this knowledge is 
strong enough to enable even an infant to recognize in his/her imagination-picture of 
reality other actualizations of the human form and to address them as fellow humans.
The knowledge of the human form enables also every human being already at a 
very early age to search for the forms of the surrounding things and to use speech 
for articulating the noematic content of the thoughts that represent these forms: a 
toddler who can master language can already call the things that surround her by the 
names of their quiddities and in doing so he/she also learns to perform deictic actions 
as well as to adjust his/her own form knowledge to the form knowledge of other 
humans. By means of this triangulation, everyone is in position to talk with everyone 
else about the same real thing as the actualization of its particular form.
The most important evidence for the fact that every human is in possession of an 
immediate knowledge of the human form is the circumstance that already toddlers 
learn that personal pronouns must not be used as proper nouns and that they are 
not mere spatio-temporal indicators, but that they are used in order to demonstrate 
the identity relation of every human: “I”, “you”, “he/she” do not indicate merely the 
three spatio-temporal modes of a certain singular event, they rather indicate that I, 
you and he/she are respectively actualizations of the human form and that my knowl-
edge of myself as actualization of this form is applicable also to You and to Him/Her. 
It is thus possible to infer from the statement “I beat You” the truth of the statement 
“You are hurt (by Me)”. On the contrary, animals that have no knowledge of their 
form can grasp (if they are capable of grasping anything) only this kind of connection 
between two spatio-temporally separate entities: “A is affected in a certain way by B 
(e.g. A senses that B attacks him)” has as result that “B is directly reciprocally affect-
ed by A (e.g. B senses that A flees)”.
Despite the fact that the knowledge of the human form is at the beginning of 
human life obscure and confused, it is nevertheless sufficient to enable the child to 
recognize that the adults who are taking care of it are more perfect actualizations 
of the human form. This is so because the knowledge of the human form informs the 
child about the degree of perfection of its own existence compared to the existence 
of adults. The knowledge of the human form also contains the knowledge of its own 
imperfection, being thus the reason that children orientate themselves to adults.
The knowledge of the human form is also the source of the normativity in hu-
man life. To know something entails namely that I treat everything, of which I have 
a certain degree of knowledge, according to this degree of knowledge, and my ap-
propriate treatment of a thing shows that I have knowledge about it. If I know that 
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the object in front of me is a spoon, then I use it in order to eat my soup, and not in 
order to hammer a nail in the wall. My knowledge of the quiddity of a thing instructs 
me also about what I should not try to do with it because I won’t succeed. This holds 
also for natural things: if I have knowledge about the quiddity of an animal or of a 
natural substance, then I behave towards it and handle it in accordance with its form. 
To harness a tiger to a cart and to try to use it as a draught animal reflects a funda-
mental ignorance of the tiger form. This ignorance can have many sources; it may lie 
in the deficient cognitive faculties of the persons involved, or it may be owed to the 
fact that they are not yet familiar with or haven’t yet grasped the form of this animal.
Thus, from the knowledge of the human form, there also naturally arises the 
knowledge of what is ought towards other humans. This kind of obligation needs no 
further motivation, no “respect for the law”19, but does motivate directly our actions 
– it is a “need of the human soul”.20 The “respect” (Kant) resp. the “obligation” (Weil) 
that we feel towards the human form and a fortiori also towards its single actualiza-
tions is the direct result of its knowledge.
Beyond this, the knowledge of the human form reveals to us that the forms of 
the formed things are real and not mere conceptual entities because the things and 
the processes that surround us are not entirely moldable by us. They display a certain 
degree of resistiveness that can be explained only by assuming that it is (at least part-
ly) caused by the forms of the things. We recognize that many of the real things that 
surround us are formed because of our knowledge that we are also formed things 
even if we cannot have a direct knowledge of their forms. The forms of the things 
are revealed to us only by our empirical and practical interaction with the things 
themselves. The knowledge of these forms is thus always fallible, revisable and per-
fectible, since it can be acquired only indirectly by means of analyzing the contents of 
imagination, but it is nevertheless this empirical and practical interaction that renders 
a clearer form knowledge possible. 
VI. Actio cogitationem sequitur
The above considerations shed some light on the nature of the difficulties en-
countered by Pragmatism in all its variations: Pragmatism – as well as his vice Empiri-
cism – cannot explain nor can it justify why the results of reflection have this peculiar 
universally normative validity. This is so because Pragmatism subordinates thinking 
to acting and regards knowledge as the result of the subsequent reflection upon the 
perception of the results of actions. The attempt to circumnavigate this obstacle 
by declaring language as part of every practice (establishing thus a relationship of 
19 Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, in Werkausgabe Bd. VII (Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp, 1982), BA 14.
20 Simone Weil, L’enracinement – Prélude à une déclaration des devoirs envers l’être humain 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1949).
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immediateness between language and world and deriving thinking from speaking21) 
only shifts the problem to the explanation of the universal validity of linguistic ex-
pressions.
Using the terms of the platonic model of the soul, Pragmatism’s error consists 
in the circumstance that it regards the “second part of the human soul”22, 23 the 
θυμοειδές, as being prior to the “first part”, the λογιστικόν (we will translate here 
λογιστικόν as “intellect” and θυμοειδές as “spontaneity”). However, both Plato 
and Aristotle, as well as the entire philosophical tradition in their succession, empha-
size that spontaneity cannot act without guidance from the intellect and that both 
instances of the soul form a partial unit. In the platonic model, this partial unit builds 
a pole that opposes the other pole of the soul, its “desiring part” (ἐπιθυμητικόν), 
with spontaneity, acting also as a sort of mediator or “interface” between the intel-
lect and the desiring part. According to Plato, the soul is a hierarchically structured, 
but consistent entity with its three parts being its constitutive and inseparable as-
pects. At the top of this hierarchy is the intellect that on the one hand is subject to 
the demands of the desiring part via the mediation of spontaneity, but is, on the other 
hand, in position to resist these demands by its reasoning power that is based on 
true knowledge, and also (if its reasoning power is strong enough) to prevail against 
them with the aid of spontaneity. Acting itself, the real and actual manifestation of 
spontaneity, is thus always guided by thinking – the activity of the intellect – even if 
this thinking is sometimes not strong enough to achieve the necessary degree of true 
knowledge or to defy the force exerted by the desires.
Aristotle’s criticism of this model is that it related spontaneity only indirectly 
to the human form, namely via the cognitive activity of the intellect, rendering thus 
the ontic relationship between soul and form diffuse – this holds also for the souls 
of every animate being. His soul model regards the soul not only as the motor of the 
individual activity of every living being, but also as the factor, which allows the form 
to unfold its form causal capacity: soul and form of a living thing make up a unit. This 
means for the human soul that both the activity of intellect and the manifestation 
of spontaneity realize jointly the human form. Since, however, the contribution of 
the intellect to the realization of the human form is not only passive (by providing 
knowledge gained from the analysis of the imagination-picture), but also active, by 
utilizing its immediate knowledge of the human form, spontaneity is always informed 
and guided by this knowledge.
Despite their particular differences both models of the soul agree on the claim 
21 Paul Lorenzen, Lehrbuch der Konstruktiven Wissenschaftstheorie (Mannheim a.o.: Bibliogra-
phisches Institut, 1987), 9. Here Lorenzen defines thinking as “imagined speaking”.
22 Plato, Politeia, 441b.
23 The soul of the animals has according to Plato only two “parts”: a desiring and a conative 
(Plato, Politeia, 441b). Plants on the other hand, manifest the fundamental vital force that 
directly transforms inanimate to animate matter (Plato, Timaios, 77b).
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that without the guidance by the knowledge of the human form, every merely em-
pirically sustained reflexive analysis of a world dominated by spontaneous activity 
cannot overcome contingency and is at the mercy of an insurmountable fundamental 
skepticism. The acceptance of the primate of conscious and cognitive thinking over 
acting does not imply, however, that knowledge is infallible. It provides nevertheless 
the standard for the recognition and the correction of errors so that not only every 
single human in the course of his or her life, but also humanity in its historical totality 
is able to gain a progressively clearer and more distinct idea of itself.
Paraphrasing a legendary allegory, we can say that the immediate knowledge of 
the human form by means of the thinking activity of the intellect is the Light of Truth, 
at which only few of us can directly gaze, but that enables the shadow in front of us, 
in which everyone can recognize the contours of Man.
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